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Abstract – Deradicalization programs have been implemented in Indonesia since 2012. This program 
employs preventive paradigm in implementing the policies it produces. During the seven years of 
implementation, deradicalization experienced challenges and obstacles. So far, there are many 
critics addressed to deradicalization program, such as criticism toward the lack of budget, prison 
facilities, deradicalization materials provided to terror convicts, post-deradicalization follow-up, as 
well as negative public reception on the idea of ex-terror convicts returning to society. These 
problems are hampering the effectiveness of deradicalization program. This paper employs theory 
of deradicalization and theory of effectiveness. It employs qualitative method with deductive and 
conceptual analysis, and the data is obtained through literature studies. This paper aims to see the 
effectiveness of deradicalization program carried out by National Agency for Combating Terrorism 
(BNPT) toward terror convicts in Indonesia. 
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Introduction 
ver since the 9/11 tragedy, states 
have been searching for means to 
manage and control 
radicalization in various forms. Example 
ranges from preventing radicalization in 
prison to enacting public policy strategy to 
counter radicalization in order to prevent 
people from associating with terrorist 
organization.3 Terrorism is a fearsome 
threat for a lot of states because 
radicalism, its key inherent aspect, is 
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and Satya Negara Indonesia University. Author of Studi Strategis dan Keamanan. 
2  Lecturer at Department of Political Science at UPN “Veteran” Jakarta. Alumni of Department of Political 
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3  John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist 
Movements, (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 155. 
intangible or invisible. This also includes 
our country, where efforts to counter it 
are still being experimented up to this day. 
Throughout 2017, there have been 
172 people suspected of involvement in 
terrorism. This is reported by the Chief of 
Indonesian National Police (Kapolri) 
General Pol Tito Karnavian. He mentioned 
that this figure is higher compared to the 
previous two years, which is 163 in 2016 
and 73 in 2015. From those 172 suspects, 10 
have been proven guilty, 76 are still in trial, 
E 
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68 are still under investigation, and 16 
were shot dead.4 Currently, the authors 
estimate that there are up to 300 terror 
convicts in all prisons throughout 
Indonesia. 
Currently, there are 800 terror 
convicts who have received 
deradicalization program from National 
Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT). 
The Chief of BNPT, Suhardi Alius, stated 
that deradicalization program has been 
implemented since 2012. “In detail, 630 ex-
convicts have been released from prison. 
Out of the 630, 325 have participated in 
deradicalization. The others have not. 
They have been released before we 
started this program in 2012. And among 
more than 300 people who have not 
participated in deradicalization program, 
some repeat their crime, namely Cicendo, 
Thamrin and Samarinda. These are 
terrorist recidivists who have not received 
deradicalization. Among those who have 
received deradicalization program, none 
became recidivist.5” 
Since terrorism is one of the greatest 
issues faced by this nation, the 
 
4 Saefudin Zuhri (b), “Muhammadiyah dan 
Deradikalisasi Terorisme di Indonesia: Moderasi 
Sebagai Upaya Jalan Tengah”, Maarif, Vol. 12, 
No. 2, 2017, p, 74. 
5 Detik.com, “Klaim Program Deradikalisasi 
Berhasil 100 Persen”, 22 May 2018, in 
Government of Indonesia has been 
searching for the best method to counter 
it. During the second tenure of President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), BNPT 
was established as the main avenue to 
eradicate terrorism in Indonesia. In the 
beginning, BNPT is an institution 
developed out of the Coordinating Desk 
for Eradicating Terrorism (DKPT), which 
was established by President SBY in 2002. 
DKPT is an institution under a 
Coordinating Ministry, which is tasked to 
assist Coordinating Ministry for Political, 
Law and Security Affairs to formulate 
policies to eradicate terrorism crime, 
which includes aspects of deterrence, 
prevention, mitigation, resolution, and all 
necessary legal actions.6  
BNPT was established under 
President Regulation No. 46 of 2010 
concerning the Establishment of National 
Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT). 
This President Regulation was amended 
by President Regulation No. 12 of 2012. The 
establishment of BNPT is a national policy 
to combat terrorism in Indonesia. BNPT is 
also established as an elaboration of Law 
https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4033545/bnpt-
klaim-program-deradikalisasi-berhasil-100-
persen, accessed on 30 May 2019. 
6  Agus Surya Bakti, Darurat Terorisme: Kebijakan 
Pencegahan, Perlindungan, dan Deradikalisasi, 
(Jakarta: Daulat Press, 2014), p. 74. 
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No. 34 of 2004 concerning National Armed 
Forces (TNI) and Law No. 2 of 2002 
concerning Indonesian National Policy 
(Polri), to provide more detailed 
provisions on “Rule of Engagement” of 
TNI, in relation to Military Operation other 
than War (MOOTW) task, including TNI’s 
rule of engagement to combat terrorism, 
as well as TNI’s task to assist Polri. 
Structurally, BNPT answers to the 
President. BNPT has five functions to 
combat terrorism, i.e. prevention, 
protection, prosecution, national 
preparedness, and deradicalization.7 
The initiative for deradicalization 
policy in Indonesia was announced in 
February 2007 when the parliament 
supported deradicalization policy by the 
government to stop the formation of 
extreme religious groups and to combat 
terrorism. Parliamentary members 
suggested the government to focus on 
poverty alleviation and provision of jobs. 
At the same time, they stressed the 
importance of not giving opportunity and 
space for radical groups and terrorist 
network to develop and disseminate their 
propaganda to recruit new members in 
the name of religion. The role of 
mainstream religious groups is essential in 
 
7  Ibid, p. 74-75. 
promoting the initiative, to unite in 
preventing radical elements from 
justifying terrorism in the name of religion. 
However, formally speaking, BNPT has 
only started to implement this program in 
2012 toward arrested terror convicts. 
With regard to deradicalization 
function, this institution conducted 
activity to combat radical ideology 
propaganda, prevent radical ideology, 
implement re-education and re-
socialization program. Deradicalization is a 
program with various objectives, with the 
focus on mitigating terrorism issues as a 
whole. Deradicalization program includes, 
but not limited to, counter-terrorism, 
preventing radicalization, provocation, 
hate speech, and interfaith hostility, 
preventing the community from being 
indoctrinated, raising community’s 
awareness to reject terrorist ideology, and 
enhancing knowledge on interfaith 
comparison.  
Out of the five BNPT functions to 
combat terrorism, deradicalization is one 
that needs to be studied in detail. 
Deradicalization program is interesting 
because it prioritizes the paradigm of 
prevention, instead of prosecution. In 
addition, psychological aspects and vibes 
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are really thick in this deradicalization 
program. This is due to this program aims 
to change the perspective or views of ex-
terrorist so they can return to the right 
path, i.e. no longer believing in radical 
ideology. 
The aim and purpose of this paper is 
to dive deeper into deradicalization 
program, particularly in its effectiveness 
since its first implementation in 2012. 
Authors also aim to collect data on the 
seven years of deradicalization program 
implementation, to be analyzed using 
qualitative methods, in order to find out 
whether or not deradicalization program 
has been implemented effectively. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Combating terrorism in Indonesia is 
proven ineffective if it relies only to 
military approaches. Bullet might pierces 
body, but it is unable to pierce the hearts 
and minds of radical groups. BNPT then 
popularized a new method called 
deradicalization. The emergence of 
deradicalization is a response to the 
flourishing religious radical ideology which 
can lead to terrorism which destroys life, 
collapsing order and corrupting religious 
teaching, society and nation.8 
 
8  Ibid, p. 173. 
9   Ibid, p. 173-174. 
The following paragraph lists 
opinions from several experts on how to 
optimize deradicalization. According to 
Agus Surya Bakti, this method is an 
attempt to invite radical society, especially 
terror convicts, ex-convicts, their family 
and network to return to the right path in 
accordance with religion, moral and ethics 
which go hand in hand with the essence of 
all religious teaching to respect diversity 
and difference. Deradicalization program 
aims to teach terror convicts to become an 
Indonesian citizen once again as per 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution within 
the territory of Indonesia, under the 
principle of unity in diversity (Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika).9 
Deradicalization is part of counter-
terrorism strategy. Deradicalization is 
understood as part of the method to 
create drastic change in the ideology of 
terrorist group. This drastic change is not 
only materialized in individuals freed from 
violence, but also freed from radical group 
which has been sheltering them. 
Deradicalization program is more akin to 
soft approach, toward the society in 
general, certain group, and also to 
individuals in radical network.10 
10   Ibid, p. 174. 
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Petrus Golose in his book, as well in 
several of his seminars, has provided an 
expert point of view on deradicalization 
issues. He argued that deradicalization is 
all attempts to neutralize radical ideology 
through interdisciplinary approaches. 
These interdisciplinary approaches include 
legal, psychology, religion and also socio-
culture. Deradicalization is aimed for 
people under the influence of radical 
ideology, which tends to commit violence 
(pro-violence). These people are usually 
terror convicts, ex-convicts, militia who 
have been involved in violence, their 
family, sympathizer, and also broader 
community. Deradicalization program is 
implemented by reorienting their 
motivation, re-education, re-socialization 
and also providing social welfare and 
equality to other community for people 
who have been involved in terrorism 
crime, as well as those who are merely 
sympathizing. Deradicalization program is 
implemented to encourage them to fully 
release or leave violence ideology, 
including stopping the dissemination of 
that ideology. In practice, this means 
deradicalization must be implemented 
along with de-ideologization process. De-
ideologization process can be the main 
 
11   Ibid, p. 174-175. 
element in attempts to disenchant and 
reorient violent terrorist ideology, so they 
can return to the right path.11 
The four components of 
deradicalization program are re-
education, rehabilitation, re-socialization 
and reintegration. Re-education is defined 
as deterrence method carried out by 
providing people with education and 
enlightenment on the threat of radical 
ideology, to prevent the ideology from 
growing. Re-education for terror convicts 
is carried out by providing enlightenment 
on deviant doctrines which legitimize 
violence. This will allow them to realize 
that committing violence, such as suicide 
bombing, cannot be considered as 
‘jihad’.12 
The next method is rehabilitation 
process. This process has two meanings, 
namely training independence and 
personality. Independence training means 
training and guiding ex-terrorists to 
prepare skills which they can use once 
they are released from prison. Whereas 
personality training is an approach to have 
a dialogue with terror convicts to 
straighten or fix their views, as well as 
providing comprehensive knowledge on 
accepting people with different point of 
12   Ibid, p. 181-182. 
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view. Then, to facilitate terror convicts in 
returning to society, they need to be 
assisted in socializing and reintegrating 
with normal neighborhood, or the 
community they used to have.13 
As an institution in charge of 
deradicalization program, BNPT is of the 
opinion that this program does not aim to 
cause Muslims to stray away from their 
religion, or even to criminalize Muslims. 
On the contrary, deradicalization program 
aims to allow Muslims to be closer with 
Islamic understanding which is moderate, 
humanist, and continue to maintain peace 
in diverse community (ummatan 
wasathan).14 
There are a lot of other states which 
also implement programs similar to 
deradicalization. The authors also believe 
that BNPT has learned a lot from other 
states experiencing similar case, i.e. 
terrorism threat. Two such examples are 
Netherland and Britain. In Netherland, in 
order to combat radicalism from 
immigrants, especially from Africa and 
Middle East, the government invited 
experts and universities to formulate 
strategy to deal with religious radicalism 
threat. The Government of Netherland has 
also implemented monitoring and 
 
13   Ibid, p. 182. 
14   Bakti, op.cit, p. 177. 
observation to religious institutions 
deemed dangerous, because it could 
potentially become a place to grow and 
disseminate radical ideologies. 
Meanwhile, Britain implemented 
deradicalization program through 
personal talk with inmates in prison. This 
talk is made voluntarily and may be 
stopped anytime. Although its impact is 
still unclear, we can be sure that British 
community and government continue to 
cooperate to prevent radicalism from 
spreading further.15 
Combating terrorism can also be 
argued as a resistance toward the 
ideology adhered by terrorists. This 
resistance also includes stopping its 
dissemination process. This program is 
important because it plays a role in 
releasing the violent ideology adhered by 
those radical terrorists, to be replaced 
with Pancasila ideology, which they have 
left behind. Deradicalization is not only 
provided to terror convicts, but also to 
their families. This is to ensure that once 
the convicts finish their sentences, they 
can be accepted by their family. In 
addition, this method also prevents the 
family from being contaminated by radical 
15   Ibid, p. 180. 
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ideology due to the influence of violent 
ideology.16 
Given that this paper aims to analyze 
the effectiveness of deradicalization 
program, we need to first understand 
what effectiveness means. The word 
‘effective’ means success or something 
which is well-conducted. Popular science 
dictionary defines effectiveness as 
appropriate use, result or something 
which supports the objective. H. 
Emerson’s argument, which was cited by 
Soewarno Handayaningrat, stated that 
Effectiveness is a measurement in the 
achievement of pre-determined 
objectives.17 The measurement of 
effectiveness will be the authors’ 
foundation in the chapter on result and 
discussion based on the data that authors 
have collected through literature review 
method. 
 
Methods 
This is a qualitative essay which employs 
logical reasoning method commonly used 
in academic papers. Data for this paper is 
collected through literature review on 
issues concerning the effectiveness of 
BNPT’s deradicalization program toward 
 
16  Saefudin Zuhri (a), Deradikalisasi Terorisme, 
(Jakarta: Daulat Press, 2017), p. 103-104. 
terror convicts in Indonesia. Through 
deductive and conceptual analysis, the 
authors analyze the deradicalization 
program since its first implementation by 
BNPT as one of the methods to combat 
terrorism, in order to find out whether or 
not it has been implemented effectively. 
 
Results and Discussion 
During the seven years of its 
implementation, deradicalization program 
to change the perspective of terror 
convicts experienced various obstacles. 
These obstacles were not only arising 
from the terror convicts as the subject of 
the program, but also from external 
factors, such as lack of budget, prison 
facilities, and also negative public 
reception toward the idea of ex-convicts 
returning to society. Not to mention, 
deradicalization materials provided to 
terror convicts are also in need of 
improvement. These external factors are 
hampering the effectiveness of 
deradicalization program. In this section, 
the authors will attempt to further study 
issues, criticisms, and obstacles in 
implementing deradicalization program. 
17   Soewarno Handayaningrat, Pengantar Studi 
Ilmu Administrasi dan Manajemen, (Jakarta: Haji 
Masagung, 1994), p. 16. 
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At implementation level, 
deradicalization is often redundant and 
cannot be interpreted concretely. This is 
because, at conceptual level, 
deradicalization is still heavily debated. For 
BNPT, deradicalization refers to US’ 
definition which has two meanings, i.e. 
disengagement and de-ideologization. 
Disengagement is attempts which lead to 
change in behavior, such as a person 
quitting terrorist network and change 
their views, as well as leaving the rules of 
their group. Further, de-ideologization is 
aimed at eliminating ideological 
understanding of Islamic political doctrine 
and replacing it with Islam as noble values 
which nurture peace. Deradicalization is 
oriented at changing individual’s spectrum 
so they can become moderate, no longer 
radical.18 
In general, this program received 
heavy criticism because it is ineffective in 
changing the mindset of terror convicts to 
not repeat terrorism crime. There are 
several cases where released terror 
convicts repeat their crime by joining with 
radical group, or even turning into lone 
 
18   Zuhri (b), op.cit, p. 75. 
19  Beritasatu.com, “Kapolri Sebut Terduga Teroris 
Kartasura Lone Wolf, Ini Maksudnya”, 5 June 
2019, in 
https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/558023/k
apolri-sebut-terduga-teroris-kartasura-lone-
wolf-ini-maksudnya, accessed on 21 June 2019. 
wolf (individual terrorist). For example, 
Rofik Asharudin who detonated a bomb 
near Security Post in Tugu Kartasura, 
Sukoharjo, Central Java during the fasting 
month (3/6/2019). Chief of Police General 
Tito Karnavian said that the explosion was 
committed by a lone wolf, meaning that 
he did it by himself. Tito added that, “It 
means that he has been self-radicalized, 
making a bomb by himself using 
information from the internet, and 
selecting, surveying his own target, 
without involving the network. However, 
since he is alone, the bomb’s quality in 
Kartasura is imperfect.19” 
Furthermore, some materials in 
deradicalization program to date have 
only been implemented through seminars 
about Pancasila, family visit to persuade 
terror convicts, and also provision of 
capital to help terror convicts starting 
business once they are free.20 According 
to Sofyan Tsauri, an ex-convict who has 
received deradicalization program since 
his arrest in 2010, even though he was 
happy to participate in this program and 
has successfully be deradicalized, he still 
20  Tirto.id, “KontraS Anggap Program 
Deradikalisasi Pemerintah Kurang Efektif”, 19 
May 2018, in https://tirto.id/kontras-anggap-
program-deradikalisasi-pemerintah-kurang-
efektif-cKKF, accessed on 4 June 2019. 
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believe that the program needs to be 
criticized and improved. After all, the 
program is still weak if it can only change 
one’s perspective. There are a lot of 
external factors which weigh ex-convicts, 
one of which is the ability to reintegrate 
with society. Not to mention that getting 
job is still difficult for him. Fortunately, he 
had been invited on various occasions as a 
speaker. He was invited by BNPT to raise 
awareness about deradicalization. He 
persuaded ex-convicts to leave the 
network an realize that they have been 
making a great mistake. Sofyan added, 
“deradicalization has not touched the 
nature of ideology, I think. And this leads 
to ineffective deradicalization efforts. 
Even if there is a counter-narrative or 
counter-ideology, this will usually be 
delivered by incompetent people who do 
not know what is takfiri and I think it is a 
mistake to employ these people.21” 
The next obstacle is the lack of 
guidance from the guardian of convicts 
(terrorism case), because many guardians 
are not equipped with capacity building, 
whether capacity as guardian or capacity 
as a person who need to handle high-risk 
convicts. They also do not receive 
 
21  Merdeka.com, “Hidup Mantan Napi Teroris. 11 
June 2018”, in 
structural recognition and clear incentive 
in relation to the risk they must face. The 
lack of regulation on the authority of state 
institution in handling terror convicts in 
prison is also an issue.22 
In the new Anti-Terrorism Law (Law 
No. 5 of 2018 concerning Eradication of 
Terrorism Crime), issues related to 
arrangement between Directorate 
General of Corrections of Ministry of Law 
and Human Rights with BNPT as state 
institution authorized in combating 
terrorism crime have not been clearly 
regulated. To this day, all terror convicts 
arrested by BNPT will always be handed 
over to prisons throughout Indonesia 
which will then become the responsibility 
of Directorate General of Corrections (DG-
PAS). 
Although there is already a 
Collaborative Agreement (PKS) between 
DG-PAS and Deputy II of Prosecution and 
Capacity Building Affairs of BNPT, as 
follow up to the signing of Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) between BNPT 
and Ministry of Law and Human Rights on 
30 May 2018, its implementation is not 
easy. The number of prisoners in Indonesia 
is currently no more than 253 thousand 
https://www.merdeka.com/khas/hidup-
mantan-napi-teroris.html, pada 4 June 2019. 
22   Ibid. 
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from various criminal cases. The largest 
portion of them are drug convicts, 
including distributor, dealer, and user. 
Meanwhile, the number of terror convicts 
in Indonesian prison is 590. “Even if we 
only have 590 people, they all have huge 
potential of destruction. Hence they got 
special treatment, it is not easy to handle 
them,” said Director General of PAS, Sri 
Puguh Budi Utami, Bc.IP, M.Si.23”  
According to the Director General fo 
PAS, there are up to 254,000 people in 
Indonesian prisons. Among those 254,000 
people, 115,000 are drug convicts. In 
addition to drug convicts, the large 
majority of prison contains people 
convicted of theft, terrorism and 
corruption. Currently, the total number of 
prisoners does not reflect the total 
availability of prison, which is only 524. 
This condition causes each prison to be 
overloaded in capacity. The number of 
prisoner in Indonesia tends to increase 
because drug user, thief, perpetrator of 
 
23  Damailahindonesiaku.com, “Meski Jumlah Napi 
Terorisme Sedikit, Namun dalam 
Menanganinya Tidak Boleh Dianggap Sepele”, 5 
Desember 2018, in 
https://damailahindonesiaku.com/meski-
jumlah-napi-terorisme-sedikit-namun-in-
menanganinya-tidak-boleh-dianggap-
sepele.html, accessed on 6 June 2019. 
24 Gatra.com, “Penghuni Lapas Di Indonesia 
Kebanyakan Napi Narkoba”, 31 Januari 2019, in 
minor crime and household violence are all 
detained in prison.24 
This condition is also an obstacle to 
deradicalization program, since prison is 
the main location for the implementation 
of this program. As information, there are 
289 terror convicts in 113 prisons in 
Indonesia. According to the Chief of BNPT, 
there needs to be one special prison which 
can replace the function of Salemba-
branch prison in Mako Brimob complex, 
Depok, especially after the riot in last year. 
One of the reasons behind the prison riot 
is the problem of overcapacity which 
resulted in hostage situation caused by 
terror convicts at Mako Brimob in early 
May of last year. Suhardi Alius stressed the 
need to build one special prison, which is 
currently being constructed in 
Nusakambangan, including Chief of 
Police’s proposal to build new prison in 
Cikeas to replace the prison in Mako 
Brimob.25 
The authors argue that 
deradicalization program should be 
https://www.gatra.com/detail/news/386285-
Penghuni-Lapas-Di-Indonesia-Kebanyakan-
Napi-Narkoba, accessed on 6 June 2019. 
25 Kompas.com, “BNPT: Ada 289 Narapidana 
Terorisme yang Tersebar di 113 Lapas”, 30 May 
2018, in 
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/30/1
2294981/bnpt-ada-289-narapidana-terorisme-
yang-tersebar-di-113-lapas, accessed on 6 June 
2019. 
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implemented in prisons which house 
terror convicts, such as in Indonesian 
Peace and Security Center (IPSC) area in 
Sentul, Bogor, which is a special prison for 
terror convicts. This will help prison guards 
to be prepared since the prison has 
adequate facility to implement 
deradicalization. BNPT needs to 
coordinate with prison on the technical 
aspects of implementing this program, as 
the prison will play more roles in the day-
to-day interaction with the terror convicts. 
Even though BNPT has Deputy of 
Prevention, Protection and 
Deradicalization affairs, BNPT personnel is 
still lacking if they are to become 
implementers of deradicalization program 
throughout Indonesia. The role of prison 
in the success of deradicalization is 
important because prison guards in the 
field are the one who will have direct 
contact with the terror convicts. However, 
BNPT shall continue to become the 
coordinator and they must provide all 
necessary instruments for deradicalization 
program. 
Furthermore, according to Professor 
of Psychology of University of Indonesia, 
Hamdi Muluk, deradicalization toward 
 
26  Tirto.id, “Pakar Psikologi: Deradikalisasi Napi 
Terorisme Butuh Waktu”, 11 March 2016, in 
https://tirto.id/pakar-psikologi-deradikalisasi-
terror convicts is anything but easy. After 
all, people who have been exposed with 
radical ideology needs a lot of time to be 
enlightened. Approaching and 
enlightening them is a very complex 
process due to the fact that terror convicts 
are not the easiest to be approached and 
talked to. They only want to interact with 
their own. The way to enlighten them is 
different than in the case of criminal 
convicts. This is because terror convicts 
have been attracted to an idea about the 
establishment of Islamic state, even if it 
must be achieved through violence. As 
such, there must be an understanding and 
correct strategy to invite them to 
communicate with outsiders. Prison guard 
must also have the ability to carry out 
special approach to them. In addition, 
guidance must be provided to terror 
convicts who have been released from 
prison.  Then, there must be a follow-up 
process to reintegrate them into the 
society after they serve their sentences.26 
Another opinion came from the 
Research Division of Applied Psychology 
of University of Indonesia (DASPR-UI). To 
this day, BNPT’s deradicalization program 
toward terror convicts tends to be 
napi-terorisme-butuh-waktu-h2y, accessed on 6 
June 2019. 
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exclusive by not involving prison guard. 
One of its activities is religion discussion by 
inviting several religious figures and 
education on state ideology. Such 
approach tends to make terror convicts 
feel special and further exclude them from 
the social process in prison in general. 
They then become unwilling to participate 
in deradicalization program because they 
deem it to be unimportant.27 
DASPR-UI has accompanied 
deradicalization program toward terror 
convicts since July 2017 in some prisons, 
such as Cipinang Prison, Cibinong Prison, 
Semarang Prison, and Pasir Putih Prison in 
Nusakambangan. Their activities include 
Life Management Training or Conflict 
Management Training which is 
participated by all convicts and prison 
guard. The involvement of prison guard 
will minimize exclusivity of terror convicts. 
Their exclusivity is the one which causes 
them to be reluctant to participate in 
general activity in prison. According to the 
senior consultant of DASPR-UI, Nasir Abas, 
one of the trainings is role playing. 
Convicts can role play as warden and vice 
 
27  Benarnews.org, “Penelitian: Kegiatan Inklusif 
Lapas Mampu Deradikalisasi Napi Terorisme”, 9 
Februari 2018, in 
https://www.benarnews.org/indonesian/berita
/lapas-deradikalisasi-02092018114320.html, 
accessed on 6 June 2019. 
28   Ibid. 
versa. This activity is aimed at making a 
person realize what it feels to become 
another person and to learn empathy. The 
point is, making them mingle with 
others.28 However, Faisal admitted that 
inclusive programs, such as management 
training, is a best practice due to its 
participative nature and also because it 
teaches skills that are necessary for terror 
convicts whether when they are in prison 
or once they are reintegrated to society.29 
So far there are a lot of institutions 
other than BNPT which are involved in 
deradicalization process. Unfortunately, 
there is no clear coordination between 
these institutions. Many institutions are 
assisting deradicalization process at 
prison without the approval of BNPT, they 
simply inquire the approval of the prison. 
Ideally, all institutions other than BNPT 
which provide assistance in 
deradicalization program in all Indonesian 
prisons should be under BNPT’s 
command. This is important because there 
must be a consistency between 
deradicalization materials and methods 
provided to terror convicts in all 
29  Voaindonesia.com, “Pemerintah Perlu Evaluasi 
Program Deradikalisasi di Lapas”, 9 Februari 
2018, in 
https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/pemerintah-
perlu-evaluasi-program-deradikalisasi-di-lapas-
/4244745.html, accessed on 4 June 2019. 
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Indonesian prisons. BNPT, as an authority 
in deradicalization program, must carry 
out supervision to all deradicalization 
activities throughout Indonesia, by not 
only leaving it to the prison, let alone 
external parties. 
Another example where external 
party assists deradicalization process, and 
even reintegration process, is in 
Purwakarta District. The regent of 
Purwakarta, Dedi Mulyadi, assists ex-
convict Agus Marshall to be employed as 
cleaning staff. In fact, since his release in 
2015, Agus has been provided with capital 
to open a food stall by Dedi. However, due 
to his inexperience as businessman, and 
lack of any business training when in 
prison, his business eventually went 
bankrupt. Since then, Dedi worked as 
cleaning staff at Sadang street, 
Purwakarta district.30 
Dedi Mulyadi’s initiatve in 
empowering terror convict can also be 
seen in his effort to establish Purwakarta 
School of Ideology in 2016. The goal of this 
school is to introduce Pancasila as 
Indonesian national ideology to local 
people. This school targets students from 
Juneor high school, senior high school, 
 
30 Matamatapolitik.com, “Mantan Napi Teroris 
Indonesia, Apa yang Harus Dilakukan pada 
Mereka?”, 17 Desember 2018, in 
https://www.matamatapolitik.com/mantan-
university and even teachers, villagers and 
officials from youth community in 
Purwakarta. The class is held once a week. 
The school enables ex-convict such as 
Agus to share his experience and educates 
students about the threat of extremist 
teaching. The class put an emphasis on 
tabayyun culture (verification and 
confirmation) among students when 
dealing with sensitive information and 
political and religious news. Other famous 
speakers also include Islamic scholar 
Azyumardi Azra and advocate of freedom 
of religion, Romo Antonius Benny 
Susetyo.31  
The initiative of Government of 
Purwakarta City is an appropriate 
alternative to reintegrate ex-terror 
convicts in Indonesia. The authority often 
faces challenge in monitoring ex-terror 
convicts throughout the country and they 
cannot rely on direction from central 
government in Jakarta or even NGO due to 
their limited outreach. BNPT has no 
representative in local area which can 
carry out routine monitoring on the 
effectiveness of reintegration program. 
There are also several experienced local 
NGOs such as Peace Generation NGO 
napi-teroris-indonesia-apa-yang-harus-
dilakukan-pada-mereka/, accessed on 2 June 
2019. 
31   Ibid. 
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which is based in Bandung and tasked to 
assist various reintegration programs for 
deported people in various districts in 
West Java such as Bandung, Majalengka 
and Subang. Their resources are spread to 
thin and required to cover a very wide 
location.32 
Government of Purwakarta is able to 
provide an appropriate program even 
though there is no special guidance and 
instruction from central government. The 
stigma in community can eventually be 
handled with the presence of School of 
Ideology which enables dialogue between 
ex-terrorist and local community. 
Government of Purwakarta also provides 
financial assistance to Agus. Such 
assistance must be adjusted to individual’s 
condition, and should not be limited to 
small businesses but also cover other type 
of jobs. In that way, the individual can feel 
grateful to local government and local 
apparatus can monitor reintegration 
process more effectively.33 
Aside from its advantage, the 
reintegration model offered by Dedi is still 
far from perfect. BNPT must cooperate 
with various NGOs to refine their 
initiatives and support counter-terrorism 
efforts of local government. Local 
 
32  Ibid. 
government will also need significant help 
to be able to effectively implement 
professional development program and 
formulate routine monitoring procedure. 
However, once again, coordination 
should remain in the hand of BNPT to 
ensure that all deradicalization programs 
in Indonesia is carried out using consistent 
material and method, not adjusted to the 
interest of external parties. Their 
proposals should be included into 
deradicalization curriculum which BNPT 
should already have in order to implement 
deradicalization program in all prisons in 
Indonesia. The authors believe that so far 
there is no standardized material and 
method for BNPT in implementing its 
deradicalization program. Ideally, BNPT 
should prepare a standardized curriculum 
which is applicable for all areas in 
Indonesia, so it can be implemented by 
external parties, such as NGO or local 
government, and obviously excluding 
prison guard, as mentioned before. 
Next, the most important part of 
deradicalization is how to reintegrate 
terror convicts to society after they have 
served their sentences. Efforts to 
reintegrate terror convicts into society are 
no easy task, because it will mean fighting 
33   Ibid. 
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the negative stigma from the society, and 
even their own family. The fact that they 
are an ex-terror convict will make people 
scared of the possibility for them 
repeating their crime. The phenomenon of 
people rejecting the funeral of a terror 
convict is clear indication that it is difficult 
for people to accept the ex-terror convict 
even if they have passed away. This fact 
can be seen in people’s rejection toward 
the idea of funeral to terror convict.34  
Based on this understanding, BNPT 
still has no concrete, effective program on 
what to do after a terror convict has 
served their sentences. Re-socialization 
and reintegration cannot be disregarded 
in the implementation of deradicalization 
program. State must provide appropriate 
distribution channel for terror convicts to 
prepare them in life. It should also be 
noted that there are quite a few reasons 
for people to commit terrorism, such as 
injustice, economy, social, culture, politics 
and so on. Terror convicts need social 
partnership, such as training of skills, to 
allow terror convicts restart their life 
independently, and achieve welfare. 
Reintegration is carried out to 
ensure that ex-convicts can reintegrate 
 
34  Muhammad Khamdan, “Rethinking 
Deradikalisasi: Konstruksi Bina Damai 
into the society, thus criminal sentence is 
purported to resolve conflict or to return 
them to society, including their family. 
Therefore, guidance outside of prison is 
required to change the condition of ex-
convict, by treating them as humanely as 
possible. This can be done by providing 
protection to the rights of ex-terror 
convicts as normal citizen. A grass root 
morality movement against terrorism or 
radical ideology needs to be built. The 
community morality movement must 
prevent ex-convicts from being alienated 
and ensure that they can play a role in 
society. Morality movement is aimed to 
assist counter-terrorism efforts which do 
not require military approach. However, 
there needs to be new research, idea and 
strategy to implement it. Since the root of 
terrorism is religious ideology and 
doctrine, and since it can be disseminated 
through various means, a multidisciplinary 
approach will be required to handle it, 
including psychological approach as 
mentioned previously.35 Unfortunately, 
the authors are of the opinion that BNPT 
has not been effective in implementing 
this process of deradicalization program.  
Penanganan Terorisme”, Jurnal Addin, Vol. 9, 
No. 1, 2015, p. 198-199. 
35   Ibid, p. 201. 
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The authors argue that there is still 
something missing from deradicalization 
program, namely the difference between 
deradicalization and disengagement. We 
need to understand and differentiate 
these two concepts. If deradicalization 
tends to lead to attitudinal modification 
(changing principle, attitude and stance), 
disengagement tends to lead to 
behavioral modification (changing 
behavior). To put it simply, disengaging 
from terrorism is not the same as being 
deradicalized. They might still retain their 
ideology and perspective, even when they 
no longer willing to be involved in 
terrorism.36 
Disengagement is often more 
realistic than deradicalization. For 
example, a terrorist can disengage from 
terrorism activity without necessarily 
reject their cause or ideology, even when 
they no longer have the willingness to 
commit terrorism. In one of his analysis, 
John Horgan argued that in the context of 
counter-terrorism, disengagement is more 
important than deradicalization because it 
can occur without deradicalization 
process.37 
 
36  Jurnalintelijen.net, “Mengenal Deradikalisasi”, 
26 Oktober 2017, in 
https://jurnalintelijen.net/2017/10/26/mengenal-
deradikalisasi/, accessed on 4 June 2019. 
According to Tore Bjorgo, there are 
two factors which cause a person to be 
disengaged from a group, i.e. push factors 
and pull factors. Push factors are negative 
condition or social pressure which drive 
people to no longer be interested in being 
part of an organization, among others 
because of legal prosecution, societal 
rebuke, loss of position in the 
organization, etc. Whereas pull factors are 
opportunity or social demand which 
attracts people to alternative they deem 
more promising, among others the desire 
to return to “normal” life, new 
employment, education and desire to 
return to family. The conclusion is that 
“pull factors” are more effective than 
“push factors.” It means that a person is 
more likely to disengage from terrorism 
because they are interested in “normal 
life,” new employment or new social 
groups compared to disengaging because 
they are afraid of punishment, violence or 
negative reputation.38 
However, the authors argue that terror 
convicts should already be disengaged 
when they undergo deradicalization 
process. Push and pull factors might 
improve re-socialization and reintegration, 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid. 
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because terror convicts might be 
interested to normal life, back to when 
they were not radical. The option to be 
employed like most people, for example, 
will be far more attractive to terror 
convicts. 
However, these pull factors might 
become unattractive upon experiencing 
failure, such as when there is no job they 
can get due to their ex-convict status. That 
is why deradicalization is still important, in 
order to minimize the possibility of 
recidivism when they fail to reintegrate. 
Even though disengagement can occur 
without deradicalization process, ideally 
this process should be carried out after 
deradicalization. Push and pull factors are 
more on the external side, while 
psychological factor plays more important 
role in turning terror convicts to terrorist 
recidivist. On the contrary, 
disengagement can be carried out during 
re-socialization and reintegration stage, 
after rehabilitation and reeducation, 
where deradicalization process has not 
been carried out comprehensively. 
However, re-socialization and 
reintegration stage cannot be 
underestimated. The authors believe that 
the effectiveness of deradicalization 
program heavily relies on this stage. 
Deradicalization does not necessarily 
mean completely eliminating a person’s 
radical ideology and behavior. Even if the 
terror convicts who participate in this 
program can deradicalize their ideology 
and behavior, they will still need to 
continue their life. Not to mention, terror 
convicts will still need to find employment 
to survive after being released from 
prison, and they must also deal with the 
stigma or public perception about 
themselves without taking into account 
their deradicalized status. 
The authors believe that BNPT has 
not effectively handled this situation. 
BNPT must pay more attention in 
returning the terror convicts to society, by 
empowering them. Creating positive 
climate on the presence of ex-terror 
convicts among the society is also very 
important. Efforts from parties outside of 
BNPT, as mentioned previously, should 
also be taken into account by the number 
one institution in Indonesia which deals 
with terrorism affairs. 
By referring to Soewarno 
Handayaningrat’s opinion which believe 
that a program can be considered 
effective if it can achieve the goal of the 
program, the authors argue that 
deradicalization program cannot be 
considered effective. While the authors do 
not employ quantitative parameter in this 
18 | Journal of Defense & State Defense | August 2019, Volume 9 Number 2 
 
paper, the qualitative analysis is already 
sufficient to prove that point. Based on 
literature review which has been 
mentioned previously, the authors argue 
that deradicalization program has been 
ineffective due to the following: 
1. There are still a lot of terrorism cases 
occurring in Indonesia, with varying 
perpetrators, from lone wolf to one 
household becomes terrorist. 
2. Deradicalization material is still unclear, 
and there is no standardized curriculum 
prepared by BNPT. 
3. BNPT has no concrete, effective 
program to ensure the future of terror 
convicts after they finish their 
sentences. 
4. BNPT’s deradicalization program 
toward terror convicts is still exclusive, 
not involving prison guard. 
5. There is no law which regulates the 
authority of state institution to manage 
terror convicts in prison. 
6. Indonesian prisons are experiencing 
overcapacity, hence there is no 
separation between terror convict 
other convicts. 
7. The lack of coordination with other 
state institutions, such as the Police, 
Armed Forces, Ministry of Law and 
Human Rights, Directorate General of 
Corrections, and Ministry of Finance 
with regard to budget proposal. 
Finally, the effectiveness of BNPT’s 
deradicalization program heavily relies on 
how BNPT can optimize stages in 
deradicalization program. However, if the 
six issues that the authors list above are 
not handled effectively, the 
implementation of deradicalization 
program will continue to be ineffective, 
even though the authors still believe that 
this program must be continued. It is 
indeed difficult, especially in the midst of 
increasing threat of terrorism, but it is not 
impossible. The authors believe that this is 
a program with high success rate. 
Therefore, the commitment of related 
institutions in implementing this program 
more effectively is absolutely required. 
 
Conclusion 
During the seven years of its 
implementation, deradicalization program 
to change the perspective of terror 
convicts experienced various obstacles. 
These obstacles were not only arising 
from the terror convicts as the subject of 
the program, but also from external 
factors, such as lack of budget, prison 
facilities, and also negative public 
reception toward the idea of ex-convicts 
returning to society. Not to mention, 
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deradicalization materials provided to 
terror convicts are also in need of 
improvement. These external factors are 
hampering the effectiveness of 
deradicalization program.  
At implementation level, 
deradicalization is often redundant and 
cannot be interpreted concretely. This is 
because, at conceptual level, 
deradicalization is still heavily debated. 
Through literature review, the authors 
found that the implementation of 
deradicalization program toward terror 
convicts has been ineffective due to 
several factors. Re-socialization and 
reintegration stages should not be 
underestimated in the implementation of 
deradicalization program. State must 
provide appropriate distribution channel 
for terror convicts to prepare them in life.  
It should also be noted that there are 
quite a few reasons for people to commit 
terrorism, such as injustice, economy, 
social, culture, politics and so on. Terror 
convicts need social partnership, such as 
training of skills, to allow terror convicts 
restart their life independently, and 
achieve welfare. On that basis, the authors 
argue that deradicalization has not been 
effective during the seven years of its 
implementation. However, a 
comprehensive counter-terrorism does 
require holistic steps, which takes time. It 
is not impossible for deradicalization to 
become a milestone in Indonesian 
counter-terrorism. However, all related 
parties must work together for the 
success of this program. 
 
Recommendation 
Even though the authors argue that 
deradicalization program has been 
ineffective, this program can have high 
success rate if implemented better. 
Therefore, the authors recommend that 
deradicalization program should be 
continued as one of the methods to 
combat terrorism. Obviously, the 
continuation of this program will require 
improvement of several sectors that are 
still lacking, especially these six: 
1. There must be a standardized 
curriculum which contains 
deradicalization materials taught 
congruently to all terror convicts in 
Indonesia 
2. The curriculum must also provide re-
socialization and reintegration plan 
after the convict finish their sentences 
3. Deradicalization program with its new 
curriculum must also involve prison 
guard in its implementation. 
4. A regulation must be enacted 
concerning the authority of state 
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institution in handling terror convicts in 
prison. 
5. Terror convicts should be placed in 
special prison, but this policy should be 
made by determining priority scale, 
meaning only certain terror convicts 
would be placed in that special prison. 
6. Coordination with related parties, such 
as the Police, Armed Forces, Ministry of 
Law and Human Rights, Directorate 
General of Corrections and Ministry of 
Finance in relation to funding. 
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